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Abstract:  One of the main goals stated in the proposals for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
reform was achieving maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for all European fisheries. In this paper, 
we propose a fishing rights allocation mechanism or management system, which specifies catch 
limits for individual fishing fleets to implement MSY harvesting conditions in an age-structured 
bioeconomic model. An age-structured model in a single species fishery with two fleets having 
perfect or imperfect fishing selectivity is studied. If fishing technology or gear selectivity depends 
on the relative age composition of the mature fish stock, fixed harvest proportions, derived from 
catchability and bycatch coefficients, is not valid anymore. As a result, not only the age-structure 
and fishing technology but also the estimated level of MSY is steering the allocation of quota 
shares. The results also show that allocation of quota shares based on historical catches or 
auctioning may not provide viable solutions to achieve MSY. 
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1 Introduction 
In European fisheries, maximum sustainable yield (MSY) has not been achieved for all 
economically valuable fish stocks. According to Facts and Figures on the Common Fisheries 
Policy, only 11 fish stocks in the Atlantic shoreline and 21 fish stocks in the Mediterranean are 
fished at MSY (EU 2014). Most of the other fish stocks remain outside safe biological limits and 
are overfished (Daw and Gray 2005; Khalilian et al. 2010; Da Rocha et al. 2012; EU 2014). This 
implies that the provision of sustainable fish stock levels, which is one of the most important 
environmental objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), has not yet been achieved in 
European fisheries. There is a consensus in the European Union (EU) on the medium term benefits 
of implementing MSY on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Therefore, 
achievement of MSY for all fish stocks has become prominent as one of the main topics within the 
scope of CFP reform proposals (EC 2009). However, it is not easy to put the concept of MSY into 
practice. Thus, the goal of MSY has not been accomplished for more than 30 years in European 
waters. 
These discussions boil down to a question of how MSY can be sustainably implemented for a 
given fish stock. Management systems play a key role in the implementation process of MSY 
harvesting conditions. Fisheries in the EU are managed through various systems. The most 
prominent options among those are rights-based management (RBM) systems. These management 
systems define fishing rights or total allowable catch (TAC) for certain fish stocks usually defined 
in tonnes, and allocate these rights to fishermen as individual fishing rights or quotas. A quota for a 
fish stock specifies the maximum allowable catch or harvest limit in terms of total weight for a 
fleet. To address our main question, this paper examines the implementation problem of MSY 
harvesting conditions under the individual (non-transferable) quota system, which is one of the most 
well-known types of RBM systems. The implementation problem is solved by proposing a well-
designed quota shares allocation mechanism that guarantees sustainability of fish stocks and 
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achieves MSY harvesting conditions. A quota shares allocation mechanism defines individual quota 
shares. A quota share is a proportion of TAC and specifies the owner’s share of a given fish stock.  
The functionality of an individual quota system depends on three main steps of the regulation. 
The initial step is the determination process of the total allowable catch (TAC) level. The second 
step is the implementation of a well-designed quota shares allocation mechanism. The final step is 
the design of effective control system to control the output landed by fleets. This study combines 
the first and second steps stated above by considering the design problem of a fishing rights 
allocation mechanism to implement MSY.  
It is known that precise data about the biological structure of a given fish population is 
required to manage the stock in accordance with MSY objectives. Given that MSY is calculated for 
a given fish stock, this paper presents an RBM system implementing MSY fishing mortality rates 
(or exploitation rates) in a simple age-structured fish population model with three interacting age 
classes (juveniles, young mature fish and old mature fish) of a single fish stock, and without loss of 
generality, two fishing fleets having perfect or imperfect fishing selectivity. In the model, fleets are 
able to select for young mature fish and old mature fish where old mature fish have a higher market 
price. This selection for two different mature age groups can be perfect or imperfect depending on 
different fishing gear types or technologies used by fleets. It is also assumed, for simplicity, that 
juveniles are not subject to harvesting. There are significant harvests of immature fish in many 
fisheries. The model can also be extended to fisheries where fishing selection for age is not 
possible. 
There is a vast literature on age-structured fish population models. In recent years, Clark 
(2010), Quaas et al. (2013), Skonhoft et al. (2012), Tahvonen (2009a,b;2010) and Holden and 
Conrad (2015), among others, have contributed to this literature of age-structured modeling for 
fisheries. Moreover, Armstrong (1999) investigated the harvest shares of trawlers and coastal 
vessels at particular TAC levels using the actual allocation rule for the Norwegian cod fishery. See 
also Armstrong and Sumaila (2001), Björndal and Brasao (2006), Stage (2006) and Diekert et al. 
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(2010) for more on applications of age-structured model for different case studies. A previous study 
of Skonhoft et al. (2012) has recently formulated an age-structured model and derived MSY fishing 
mortalities similar to that of Reed’s (1980). In the current study, the age-structured fish population 
model developed by Skonhoft et al. (2012) is employed and fishing mortality rates at MSY are 
calculated using a simple Lagrangian method proposed by them. However, the implementation 
problem of this solution concept using quotas is not the main purpose of their paper. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the allocation problem of fishing quota shares to 
implement the MSY solution concept by a mechanism or management system. MSY harvesting 
conditions specify fishing mortalities for each age class by maximizing overall yield. Finding 
optimal harvest policy is a centralized problem from a viewpoint of a social planner and related to 
sustainable use of the biological resource. We propose a management system (or quota allocation 
mechanism) to achieve the MSY harvesting policy. The fishery management system, by setting 
TAC and specifying individual quotas, produces total biomass yield that is identical to MSY. We 
also investigate the implications of different fishing technologies on the design of management 
systems. Within this framework, we propose a new quota shares allocation mechanism and 
determine possible quota shares allocations to solve the implementation problem under different 
fishing technologies or gear selectivities. The analysis indicates that a well-designed RBM system is 
required to implement MSY harvesting conditions. It is also shown that not only the age-structure 
and fishing technology but also the estimated level of MSY is steering the allocation of fishing 
rights. 
The allocation of quota shares, as percentages of the overall TAC, is usually based on 
historical catches (grandfathering rule). Moreover, auctions are also used to determine the allocation 
of fishing rights. The findings of this paper imply that allocating quotas based on historical catches 
or auctioning may not provide viable solutions to achieve MSY harvesting conditions since these 
allocation mechanisms do not take into account the age distribution of the fish population and 
fishing technologies of fleets. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and provides 
basic definitions. In Section 3, the optimization problem to find MSY fishing mortalities is 
formulated. Section 4 studies the implementation problem of MSY harvesting conditions. Section 5 
provides a numerical illustration of the main results. Section 6 discusses policy implications of the 
analysis and contains concluding remarks. 
2 Age-Structured Population Model 
 The population model is based on three cohorts of a fish population. The juveniles are the 
members of the youngest class in the population. They are neither harvestable nor members of the 
spawning stock, while old mature and young mature cohorts are both harvestable and members of 
the spawning stock. In addition, old mature fish have higher fertility rate than young mature fish, as 
supposed by Reed (1980). Moreover, weight per fish is higher for the older fish ( <  <  ). 
It is assumed that the juvenile has no market value and price per weight for old mature fish is higher 
than the price per weight for young mature fish ( = 0,    <   ). The population during any 
season t is defined as follows: Juveniles, , (age < 1), Young matures, , (1 ≤ age < 2), Old 
matures, , (2 ≤ age). 
In the model, the Beverton-Holt recruitment function, which is increasing and concave for 
both age classes, is employed (Beverton and Holt 1957). The number of recruits to the fish 
population during season t is:  
                             , = ,, , =  , + , [ +⁄ (, + ,)].                   (1)   
The number of recruits depends on the abundance of old mature and young mature fish and 
parameters of ,  and . The parameters of  and  are the scaling and shape parameters, 
respectively. Besides,  > 1 is the fertility parameter indicating the higher natural fertility of old 
mature fish than that of young mature fish. The number of young mature fish during season t+1 is 
defined by the following equation:                                                                                                           
             , =  , =  ,, ,.                                             (2) 
The number of old mature fish at t+1 is given as: 
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, =   (1 −  ,) , +  (1 −  ,) ,.                             (3) 
In the above notation, ,  ,   are the fixed natural survival rate of juveniles, young mature fish 
and old mature fish, respectively. Moreover, , and , are the aggregate fishing mortality rates 
(or exploitation rates) of young mature and old mature fish.  
In this study, it is assumed that fishing activity occurs after spawning and before natural 
mortality. We propose a quota shares allocation mechanism at the population equilibrium (, =
, = ). It is also assumed without loss of generality that the total biomass of the old mature fish 
is less than the total biomass of the young mature fish (  <  ) at steady-state outcomes. 
This assumption refers to a stylized real life situation, but all results can easily be extended to other 
possible cases (  ≥  ).  
The following equations are the biological constraints of the maximization problem to find 
MSY harvesting conditions. (4) is the recruitment constraint and (5) is the spawning constraint.  
                                                                =  (, ),                                                                  (4) 
                                           =   (1 −  ) + (1 − ).                                                  (5) 
The population model developed by Skonhoft et al. (2012) is described so far. In what follows, 
maximum sustainable yield harvesting conditions and the implementation problem using quotas are 
defined under given age-structured population dynamics. 
3 Maximum Sustainable Yield  
 
 In this section, MSY harvesting conditions are investigated. The problem of finding MSY 
harvesting strategies,   (total fishing mortality rate of the young mature fish cohort) and   (total 
fishing mortality rate of the old mature fish cohort), for this environment has been studied in the 
literature (Reed 1980; Skonhoft et al. 2012). This section is presented for completeness of the paper. 
The total biomass harvested at the population equilibrium must be equal to the sum of the total 
biomass harvest of old mature fish and the total biomass harvest of young mature fish. That is, the 
total biomass harvest function is: 
                                                 ! =      +     .                                                     (6) 
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The biological constraints for the total harvest maximization problem are (4) and (5). The general 
problem to find MSY harvesting conditions is to find the maximum total biomass harvest given 
these biological constraints. That is, the problem is to maximize (6) subject to (4) and (5).  
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem, Skonhoft et al. (2012) showed, assuming  ⁄ >
 ⁄ , that the conditions for fishing mortality (or exploitation) rates, which can be derived from 
the first order necessary conditions are: 1) Given that " =  ⁄ <  ⁄ ,  = 1 and 0 <  < 1; 
2) Given that   < " <  ⁄⁄ ,  = 1 and  = 0; 3) Given that   < " =  ⁄⁄ , 0 <
 < 1 and  = 0. 
4   Quota Implementation of MSY  
 
 The implementation problem is to find a policy instrument (or management system) such 
that outcomes of the instrument is identical to MSY harvesting conditions. We refer the reader to 
Jackson (2001) for more details about the general implementation problem in different economic 
settings. The main problem is to find quota shares allocations such that if these quota shares are 
assigned to fleets with different fishing gear types, the resulting total biomass harvest and harvest 
compositions are identical to the total biomass harvest and harvest compositions at MSY. The 
aggregate fishing mortality rates for two mature age classes at MSY ( and ) are found using the 
maximization problem defined in the previous section. To implement MSY harvesting conditions, 
we first need to set the overall TAC equal to the aggregate fishing mortalities of mature stocks at 
MSY.  We then determine the possible allocations of quota shares given the overall TAC to solve 
the implementation problem. To find the possible allocations of quota shares we need to define the 
important details related to fishing fleets. The problem to find MSY harvesting policy is a 
centralized optimization problem and the information related to fishing vessels is not required for 
this problem. To use a management system or to be able to assign individual quotas to fishing 
vessels, we need to make assumptions related to number of fishing vessels, fishing technologies, 
fishing days and catch compositions of fishing vessels for mathematical formulation of the fishery 
and fishing behavior. These assumptions can alter the assignment process of individual quota shares 
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and outcomes of our quota shares allocation mechanism. This actually validates the main policy 
implication of this article, technological structure of fisheries and biological structure of fish 
populations should be considered in defining individual fishing rights. 
4.1 Fishing Fleets: Technologies  
 In this mechanism design setting, there are without loss of generality two fishing fleets 
characterized by their fishing technologies or gear types. These technologies are such that only 
mature fish can be harvested (juveniles cannot be harvested), and selecting for old mature fish or 
young mature fish may be perfect or imperfect. This type of selection is observed in some fisheries 
(Quaas et al. 2013; Madsen 2007; Broadhurst and Millar 2011; Squires and Vestergaard 2013). The 
current analysis focuses on the situation in which both fleets target or try to select the old mature 
class since the market price of old mature fish is higher than the market price of young mature fish. 
We also assume that each fleet has one type of fishing gear and it is impossible to change the gear 
during a given season.     
Catchability and bycatch coefficient for fleet # are denoted by $ and $, respectively. For 
fleet #, $ is the proportion of old mature fish catch per unit of effort from total biomass of old 
mature fish, and $ is the proportion of young mature fish catch per unit of effort from total 
biomass of young mature fish. The actual fishing effort of fleet # is denoted by %. Under given 
coefficients, total harvest of fleet # is defined as & = ∑ $(((%()() . 
The fishing technology or the degree of selection for fleet # is denoted as *. This degree of 
selection for fishable age classes can depend on gear types used by fleets (Madsen 2007).  
Technology level of * simply derived from the catchability and bycatch coefficients of fleet #, and 
relative age composition of mature age classes. Let * =
+,
-.-/-
+,
-.-/-+,
0.0/0
 be the fishing technology of 
fleet #. At a given * level, exploitation rate of old mature fish is equal to *1100 percent of &, and 
exploitation rate of young mature fish is equal to (1 − *)1100 percent of &. This implies that 
actual age composition of the total harvest is linked to the age composition in the mature age fish 
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stock. It is easy to see that fleet # harvests primarily young mature fish if relative abundance of 
young mature fish (/0
/-
) is very high. We assume that the lower bound for fishing technologies 
without loss of generality is 0.5 because it is considered that both fleets have fishing technologies 
compatible with harvesting the targeted (old mature) fish. Therefore, * and * are always greater 
than 0.5. The implication of this assumption is that the relative abundance of young mature fish is 
not very high (/0
/-
< +,
-.-
+,
0.0
). Moreover, fleets harvest more old mature fish than young mature fish in 
terms of weight until the old mature fish stock is completely harvested. That is, $ > $ since we 
assumed that   <   for the fish stock. Given the structure of the fishery (* > 0.5 and 
  <  ), the first age class that gets fully harvested in the mature stock is always the old 
mature age class. This set of assumptions is sufficient to ensure that the old mature cohort is the 
only cohort that can be fully harvested at any management systems implementing MSY harvesting 
conditions. If we change this set of assumptions, there can be cases where young mature age class is 
fully harvested. This type of harvesting cannot maximize the overall yield, and hence it is 
impossible to implement MSY for such cases.  
These assumptions are also biologically reasonable. For example, the population for the 
North Sea cod is dominated by the age (or year) classes one and two. Estimated average values for 
cod population year-class abundance are 273 million for age class one (wet weight 32 grams), 84.3 
million for age class two (wet weight 466 grams),  24.8 million for age class three (wet weight 1856 
grams), 8.86 million for age class four (wet weight 3980 grams), 3.56 million for age class five (wet 
weight 5990 grams), 1.44 million for age class six (wet weight 8212 grams), 0.60 million for age 
class seven (wet weight 9420 grams), 0.27 million for age class eight (wet weight 10622 grams), 
0.12 million for age class two (wet weight 11543 grams), 0.079 million for age class two (wet 
weight 12235 grams) (Hansson et al. 1996). Given that North Sea cod usually reach maturity at the 
age of 3-5 years, we can label age classes 3 to 5 as young mature fish and age classes 6 to 10 as old 
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mature fish. Then, the total biomass of young mature fish is  = 102616 tonnes, and the total 
biomass of old mature fish is  = 22696.95 tonnes. 
If * = 1 ($ = 0), then fleet # has a perfect fishing selectivity and hence can select for only 
old mature fish. If * < 1 ($ > 0), the selection is imperfect and hence fleet harvests both old 
mature fish and young mature fish. There are four possible cases given the structure of fishing 
technologies considered in this paper. In Case 1, fleet 1 has perfect fishing selectivity (* = 1), and 
fleet 2 has imperfect fishing selectivity (0.5 < * < 1). There are two fleets having imperfect 
fishing selectivity in Case 2 (0.5 < * < 1 and 0.5 < * < 1). In Case 3, fleet 2 has perfect fishing 
selectivity (* = 1), and fleet 1 has imperfect fishing selectivity (0.5 < * < 1). Finally, Case 4 
refers to a fishery with two identical fleets having perfect fishing selectivity (* = * = 1). We 
consider only the most interesting cases, Case 1 and Case 2, in this paper. We refer the reader to 
(Kanik and Kucuksenel 2015) for a complete treatment.  
This type of fishing technology or degree of selection is also observed in real life fisheries. 
Fleets choose fishing grounds according to expected age composition in that fishing ground since 
different cohorts can be found in different regions in the British Columbia, Canada, groundfish 
trawl fishery (Branch and Hilborn 2008). Fish can be segregated perfectly or imperfectly by size 
and age for some species, and fleets choose particular fishing areas to target one specific size or age 
(Walters and Martell 2004; Bacheler et al. 2010). See also Skonhoft and Gong (2014) for perfect 
selectivity assumption for the old cohort in age-structured modelling of the Atlantic salmon fishery. 
Moreover, Madsen (2007) estimates selectivity of fishing gears used in the Baltic Sea cod fishery 
and shows that the degree of precision for selecting specific age groups can be increased by using 
passive gear types. Perfect selectivity for the old mature fish cohort (* = 1 or $ = 0), is always 
possible in our environment if the mesh size is large enough. Moreover, small fish can escape from 
specially designed mesh and hence fish larger than a specific size can be harvested in trawls (Millar 
and Fryer 1999).  
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4.2 Fishing Fleets: Fishing Days 
We assume that fishing can occur on several days during a given season 7. On the first fishing 
day, two fleets simultaneously exert fishing effort and harvest the same total weight of fish on the 
first fishing day due to identical capacity of fishing vessels. Note that * =
+,
-.-/-
+,
-.-/-+,
0.0/0
 at the 
beginning of each fishing day. Thus, the utilization of the technology level is constant due to 
simultaneous effort in a given fishing day, but it can change depending on the relative abundance of 
young mature stock at the beginning of the next fishing day.  If there is a fleet whose quota is not 
reached or fulfilled, then fishing continues on the second fishing day. Otherwise, fleets stop fishing 
and fishery is closed for the season 7. If there are two fleets on the second day, then the second day 
is identical to the first day. If there is one fleet on the second day, the fleet continues fishing and 
fulfills its quota according to its updated utilization of the fishing technology due to change in the 
age composition of the fish stock given that fishing technology is imperfect. The relative abundance 
of mature age stocks changes on the second day and hence the utilization of the fishing technology 
changes on the second day unless fishing technology is perfect on the first fishing day. If all old 
mature fish are harvested on the first day, then utilization of fishing technology is updated to zero 
for a fleet with imperfect fishing technology on the first fishing day. Thus, the fleet can fulfill its 
remaining quotas only with young mature fish. 
 Fishing days continue in a similar fashion. Fishing days end if TAC is reached (all fleets 
fulfill their quotas) or there is a fleet with perfect fishing selectivity whose quota is not exhausted 
and all old mature fish are harvested on the previous day. This is to say that fishing days can end 
even though TAC is not reached in Case 1. The reason is that it is not possible for a fleet with 
perfect selectivity to fulfill its remaining quota on a given day if all old mature fish are harvested on 
the previous fishing day. This is due to the assumption that the fleet has one type of fishing gear 
(mesh size is large enough for perfect fishing selectivity) and it is impossible to change the gear 
during a given season. See the last paragraph in Section 5 for an illustration of this case.   
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We also assume that fleets are trying to minimize number of fishing days to fulfill their 
quotas. This implies that fleets exert the highest possible level of fishing effort on each fishing day, 
and hence fishing stops after a finite number of fishing days. If there is only one fleet on the second 
fishing day and all old mature is harvested on the first fishing day, it may take infinitely many 
fishing days for the fleet to fulfill its quota if the fleet exerts infinitesimal fishing effort level in each 
of the remaining fishing days. The assumption of maximum possible effort on each fishing days 
rules out this possibility. 
4.3 Fishing Fleets: Catch Compositions 
We first look at the the simplest case of our model in which all quota is assigned to a fleet (a 
corner solution).  The quota share or percentages of the overall TAC assigned to fleet # is denoted 
by 8 ∈ [0,1]. Suppose without loss of generality that 8 = 1 and 8 = 0. Assuming that * = 0.8, 
 ≥ 80 and the quota allocation of fleet 1 is 8;<= = ;<= = 100 ≤   +
[(1 − *) *⁄ ]   tonnes, fleet 1 catches *;<= = 80 tonnes of old mature fish while capturing 
(1 − *);<= = 20 tonnes of young mature fish. In this case, fleet 1 cannot harvest all old mature 
age class due to fishing technology constraint unless ;<= =   + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . If all old 
mature age class is harvested on the first fishing day, the total bycatch of young mature age class is 
equal to [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . Since fleet 1’s quota is exhausted on the first fishing day, fishing 
stops at the end of the first fishing day. If * = 0.8, and  < *;<= = 80, then fleet 1 captures 
 tonnes of old mature fish and [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   = 0.25   tonnes of young mature fish 
on the first day by exerting fishing effort % = 1 $⁄ . Individual quota is not exhausted and fishing 
continues on the second day. Moreover, all old mature fish are harvested on the first day.  
On the second day, the fleet exerts fishing effort to fulfill its quota with only young mature 
fish and catches 100 − 1.25 tonnes of additional young mature fish. Thus, the fleet’s total 
harvest is  tonnes of old mature fish and 100 −  > [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   tonnes of young 
mature fish. Note that (1 − *);<= < ;<= −   since fleet 1 fulfills its remaining quota by 
harvesting young mature fish on the second day under the assumption that fishermen are non-
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satiated. The cost of fishing is not modelled explicitly for the general purpose of this paper. This 
behavioral assumption guarantees that a fleet continues exerting effort and whenever possible 
harvesting fish till the fleet fulfills its assigned quota independent of the cost structure of fishing. It 
may be impossible for a fleet with perfect fishing technology to fulfill its quota and fishing days can 
end even though TAC is not reached in Case 1. Fleets are quota-filling whenever possible and 
fishing activity does not stop unless TAC is reached or it is impossible to fulfill TAC due to perfect 
fishing technology. This implies that the ratio of old mature fish harvest to the young mature fish 
harvest derived from fishing technologies (1 to (1 − *) *⁄ ) is valid until the old mature fish class is 
fully harvested. 
 We now look at the possible solutions where quota shares are such that 8 > 0 and 8 > 0 
(an interior solution). In Case 1, if fleet 1 harvests ? tonnes of old mature fish on the first day, then 
fleet 2 harvests *? tonnes of old mature fish and (1 − *)? tonnes of young mature fish given that 
? + *? ≤   and ? is less than the quota assigned to both fleet 1 and fleet 2, ? ≤
min {8;<=, 8;<=}. If ? = 8;<= < 8;<=
 
and  = ? + *?, then fleet 2 fulfills its 
remaining quota with young mature fish on the second day since all old mature fish would be 
harvested on the first day.  Therefore, fleet 2 harvests 8;<= − ? additional tonnes of young 
mature fish on the second day and its total harvest of young mature fish is equal to 8;<= − *? 
tonnes.  
On the other hand, if  ? = 8;<= < 8;<=
 
and  − ? > *?, then fleet 2 exerts effort on 
the second day and harvests both age classes according to its fishing technology and assigned quota 
level. The total biomass of old mature stock on the second fishing day is  − ? − *? tonnes 
and the total biomass of young mature stock on the second day is  − (1 − *)?. Fleet 2 
harvests all remaining old mature fish on the second day to minimize the number of fishing days. 
The degree of selection is +-
-(.-/-EFEG-F)
+-
-(.-/-EFEG-F)+-
0(.0/0E(EG-)F)
 on the second day. If its quota is still not 
fulfilled, then the fleet fulfills its remaining quota with young mature fish on the third fishing day 
(the degree of selection is zero), and fishing season ends. If ? = 8;<= < 8;<=, then fleet 1 
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fulfills its remaining quota with old mature fish on the second day (the degree of selection is now 
equals to one due to change in the age composition of the fish stock), and hence harvests 8;<= −
? =  − (1 + *)? additional tonnes of old mature fish on the second day.  
In Case 2, for example, if fleet 1 harvests *? tonnes of old mature fish and (1 − *)? tonnes 
of young mature fish during a given season, then fleet 2 harvests *? tonnes of old mature fish and 
(1 − *)? tonnes of young mature fish given that ? ≤ min {8;<=, 8;<=}. If without loss of 
generality ? = 8;<= < 8;<=, then fleet 2 fulfills its quota on the remaining fishing days 
according to its fishing technology constraint, the assigned quota level and the age composition of 
surviving fish stocks as in Case 1. 
To summarize, the initial process of estimating the catch compositions of fleets is to 
determine the cut-off levels for TAC under given fishing technologies. For example, consider a 
fishery including two fleets having imperfect fishing selectivity (0.5 < * < 1, 0.5 < * < 1). 
Under given fishing technologies, the cut-off levels for TAC are   + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   and 
  + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . The cut-off   + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   is the overall TAC at which 
all old mature age class can be harvested on the first fishing day by fleet # if all quotas are assigned 
to fleet #. If ;<= < min {   + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  ,   + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   }, then fishing 
stops at the end of the first fishing day and catch composition of fleet # can be defined as follows: 
                                    8 ;<= =  ℎ
   + 
  ,  ∑ 8), = 1                                          (7) 
where ℎ is the exploitation rate of old mature age class by fleet #, and  is the exploitation rate of 
young mature age class by fleet #. Then, the total biomass harvest of fleet # is equal to 8 ;<= 
consisting of ℎ    tonnes of old mature fish, and    tonnes of young mature fish. Catch 
compositions of fleets for the specified TAC can also be expressed in the following way: 
ℎ    = * 8 ;<= >     = (1 − *) 8 ;<=,                                   (8) 
    ℎ   = * 8 ;<= >    = (1 − *) 8 ;<=.                                    (9) 
In this specific environment in which fishing stops at the end of the first fishing day, the total 
weight of old mature fish harvest is higher than the total weight of young mature fish harvest for 
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both fleets. On the other hand, the TAC may also be between the two cut-off levels or higher than 
the maximum of the cut-off levels depending on MSY harvesting conditions. The number of fishing 
days can also be more than one to fulfill the assigned quota allotment. 
4.4 Results 
 The following equation defines the overall TAC for the allocation mechanism given MSY 
harvesting conditions,  and :  
                                          ;<= =    +   .                                     (10) 
 Given this fishery, the remaining problem is to determine the allocations of quota shares or 
fishing rights to implement MSY under different assumptions about fleets’ fishing technologies. It 
should be noted that only the fishing mortality solutions that are compatible with the fishing 
technologies are analyzed. For instance, given that both fleets have imperfect fishing selectivity, 
then MSY harvesting conditions such as  = 0 and  = 1 or  = 0 and  < 1  are not taken into 
consideration. Implementation of MSY is not possible for these cases since total harvest of young 
mature fish can never be equal to zero with imperfect fishing technology. Hence, the allocation of 
quota shares for MSY harvesting conditions which can be obtained under given fishing 
technologies are determined and represented in the following two different cases. Note that fishing 
activity occurs after spawning and before natural mortality, and hence 0 ≤  < 1 and  = 1 can 
be a possible solution. 
Case 1: Fleet 1 has perfect fishing selectivity and fleet 2 has imperfect fishing selectivity (* = 1 
and  0.5 < * < 1). 
Possible allocations of quota shares to implement MSY harvesting conditions at different 
biomass conditions for Case 1 are characterized in the following propositions. The mechanism 
specifies TAC and quota shares allocations for a given biomass condition and total fishing mortality 
rate for each mature stock at MSY.   
Proposition 1.1: If MSY fishing mortalities are such that  = 0 and 0 <  ≤ 1, then ;<= =
  , and MSY can be achieved only for a quota share 8 = 1 and 8 = 0. 
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Proof: Using (10), ;<= =   . Under these conditions, MSY can only be implemented by 
assigning all quota shares to fleet 1 since fishing mortality of young mature fish can only be equal 
to zero for this allocation, 8 = 1 and 8 = 0. MSY is implemented on the first fishing day and 
Fleet 2 should be kept outside the allocation process of fishing rights to implement MSY harvesting 
conditions. □ 
Proposition 1.2: If MSY fishing mortalities are 0 <  < 1 and  = 1 such that (i) .-/-(EG-)(G-) ≤
   < [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  , or (ii)    < .-/-(EG-)(G-) , then ;<= =    +  , and 
MSY can be achieved for any quota shares such that for (i) 8 ∈ I8, 8J and 8 = 1 − 8; for (ii) 
8 = 8 and 8 = 1 − 8, where 8 = ( − *;<=) [;<=(1 − *)]⁄  and 8 = K-L-(0MN-)OPQ. 
Proof: Given that (i) holds,   < ;<= =    +   <   + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . If 
all quota shares are assigned to fleet 1, it is easy to see that MSY cannot be implemented since fleet 
1 does not harvest young mature fish. On the other hand, if all quotas are assigned to fleet 2, then 
the fleet fulfills its total quota on the first fishing day before harvesting all old mature fish. Owing 
to the fact that both corner solutions cannot be used to solve the implementation problem, interior 
solutions should be checked. It is now shown that any quota shares such that 8 ∈ I8, 8J and 
8 = 1 − 8 > 0 can be used to implement MSY harvesting conditions given that fishing mortality 
rate of young mature fish is above a certain level at MSY.  Fleet 1 fulfills its quota on the first 
fishing day ℎ    = ? = 8;<= and     = 0 since we assume that fleets try to minimize 
the number of fishing days. Then, either ℎ   =  − ? ≥ *? or ℎ  =  − ? <
*? is possible.  
 Suppose that ℎ  =  − ? ≥ *?. Then,  ≥ (1 − *)( − ?) *⁄ .
  
This 
implies that fleet 1’s quota exhausts first on the first fishing day, and fleet 2 tries to fulfill its 
remaining quota with old mature fish and young mature fish on the second fishing day since 
8;<= ≥ ?. Total biomass harvest on the first fishing day is equal to 2?. The total biomass of old 
mature fish on the second day is  − (1 + *)? and the total biomass of young mature fish is 
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 − (1 − *)?. The degree of selection for fleet 2 is equal to 
+-
-(.-/-E(G-)F)
+-
-(.-/-E(G-)F)+-
0(.0/0E(EG-)F)
 
on the second fishing day since relative abundance of young mature fish changes. Fleet 2 harvests 
all of remaining old mature fish on the second fishing day. If fleet 2’s quota is not exhausted at the 
end of the second fishing day, the fleet fulfills its quota with only young mature fish on the third 
fishing day. Moreover, 2  (1 + *) ≤ ;<=⁄  since 8;<= ≥ ?. Therefore, different quota 
shares allocations produce the same TAC, which is equal to  + , if  ≥
.-/-(EG-)
.0/0(G-)
=
∗.  
 At 8, fleet 2 should fulfill its quota by harvesting only young mature fish on the second 
fishing day after all old mature fish are harvested on the first fishing day. This implies that ℎ   
should be at the minimum possible level such that ℎ  =  − ? = *?
 
and ? = 8 ;<= =
 (1 + *)⁄ . Therefore, 8 = K-L-(0MN-)OPQ. At 8, fleet 2 should harvest the maximum possible 
weight of old mature fish on the first fishing day besides its total young mature fish harvest is 
 after three fishing days at most. This is only possible if 1 − 8 ;<= (1 − *) = . 
Thus, 8 = ( − *;<=) [;<=(1 − *)]⁄ .
 
 Now, suppose that ℎ =  − ? < *?. This is only possible if fleet 2 fulfills its quota 
on the first fishing day and fleet 1 fulfills its remaining quota with old mature fish on the second 
fishing day. That is, biomass condition (ii) holds and  < ;<= < 2 (1 + *)⁄ . Moreover, 
due to fleet 1’s fishing technology,  =  = [(1 − *) *⁄ ] ( − ?) =
(1 − 8) ;<=. This implies that 8 = 8 = ( − *;<=) [(1 − *);<=]⁄ . □ 
Proposition 1.3: If MSY fishing mortalities are 0 <  < 1 and  = 1 such that    ≥
[(1 − *) *⁄ ]  , then ;<= =    +   , and MSY can be achieved for quota shares 
such that 8 ∈ [0, 8] and 8 = 1 − 8, where  8 =    (1 + *) ;<= ⁄ . 
Proof: Under these conditions,   + [(1 − *)  *⁄ ]   ≤ ;<= =    +   . MSY 
can be implemented if all quota shares are assigned to fleet 2 since fleet 2 harvests all old mature 
fish and also    young mature fish by fulfilling its remaining quota on the second fishing day 
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with young mature fish after all old mature fish are harvested on the first fishing day. On the other 
hand, assigning all quotas to fleet 1 cannot be a solution since fleet 1 does not bycatch young 
mature fish. Hence, there is an upper bound of 8, and fleet 1 fulfills its all quotas by harvesting old 
mature fish for all other quota shares that are equal to or below this  8 level, 8. Now, possible 
interior solutions such that 8S[0, 8] and 8 = 1 − 8 > 0 should be checked. Since TAC is set at 
a level equal to or higher than   + [(1 − *)  *⁄ ]  , all old mature fish are harvested on 
the first fishing day regardless of the quota shares allocation. Moreover, fleet 2 fulfills its remaining 
quota with young mature fish for all feasible quota shares on the second fishing day since 
   ≥ [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . According to the fishing technologies, it is known that on the first 
fishing day, if fleet 1 captures ? tonnes of the old mature fish, fleet 2 captures  * ? tonnes of the old 
mature fish and  (1 − *) ? tonnes of the young mature fish as long as ? + *? ≤ . At 8, we 
have ℎ  = ? = 8;<=, ℎ  = ?*
 
and  =  ≥ (1 − *)?. Therefore, quota 
shares allocations satisfying 0 ≤  8 ≤     (1 + *) ;<= ⁄  can be used to solve the 
implementation problem of MSY harvesting conditions. □  
Case 2:  Fleets have imperfect fishing selectivity (* < 1 ?T * < 1).  
Proposition 2.1: If MSY fishing mortalities are 0 <  < 1 and  = 1 such that    <
min { [(1 − *) *⁄ ] , [(1 − *) *⁄ ] }, then ;<= =    +   , and MSY cannot 
be achieved for any quota shares. 
Proof: MSY cannot be implemented since the old mature fish age class cannot be fully harvested 
due to the fact that TAC is set below the cut-off levels. The weight of old mature fish harvest is 
equal to * 8 ;<= +  * 8 ;<= = ℎ  + ℎ  <   and young mature fish harvest is 
equal to     on the first fishing day. On the second fishing day, fleets harvest old mature fish 
and hence young mature fish due to imperfect selectivity to fulfill their quotas. Then, total harvest 
of young mature fish is more than the total harvest of young mature fish at MSY. As a result, it is 
not possible to implement MSY harvesting conditions using quotas. □ 
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Proposition 2.2: If MSY fishing mortalities are 0 <  < 1 and  = 1 such that 
[(1 − *) *⁄ ]  ≤    < [(1 − *) *⁄ ] , then ;<= =    +   , and MSY 
can be achieved for any quota shares such that 8 ∈ I8, 1J and 8 = 1 − 8 where 8 =
[U- V-EW-XYZ]
(G0EW-)XYZ
. 
Proof:  Under these conditions,   + [(1 − *)  *]⁄     ≤ ;<= =    +     <
  + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   . MSY can be implemented if all quota shares are assigned to fleet 1. 
In such a case, fleet 1 harvests   tonnes of old mature fish on the first fishing day and    
tonnes of young mature fish in two fishing days, where    = [ + [(1 − *)  *]⁄    and [ 
is equal to the weight of young mature fish harvested by fleet 1 on the second fishing day to fulfill 
its remaining quotas after the old mature fish population is fully harvested on the first fishing day 
(0 ≤ [ < {[(1 − *) *⁄ ]    − [(1 − *)  *]⁄   }). At the other corner solution, 8 = 1 and 
8 = 0, fleet 2 fulfills its quota on the first fishing day before the old mature fish age class is fully 
harvested. Hence, MSY cannot be implemented using 8 = 1 and 8 = 0. As a result, there is a 
lower bound for 8. For each 8 ∈ I8, 1J, we can find constants \ and ] such that ;<= =   +
8  [(1 − *) *⁄ ] + \(8) + (1 − 8 ) [(1 − *) *⁄ ] + ](1 − 8). Both fleets may 
fulfill their remaining quotas by catching young mature fish on the second fishing day after the old 
mature fish age class is fully harvested on the first fishing day. Thus, \(8) ≥ 0 and ](1 − 8) ≥
0. If = ] = 0 , then 8^ = (K-L-_N-OPQ)N0(N0_N-)K- L- . For a given 8, ℎ
   = 8  , ℎ
   = (1 −
8)  ,   = 8  [(1 − *) *⁄ ] + \(8),    = (1 − 8)  [(1 − *) *⁄ ] +
](1 − 8). This implies that 8 ≥ 8^  since \, ] ≥ 0 and * > *.  Therefore, 8 = 8^  and 
 * 8;<= = 8^  . Then, 8 =
[U- V-EW-XYZ]
(G0EW-)XYZ
 to implement MSY harvesting conditions. □ 
Proposition 2.3: If MSY fishing mortalities are 0 <  < 1 and  = 1 such that    ≥
max { [(1 − *) *⁄ ] , [(1 − *) *⁄ ] }, then ;<= =    +   , and MSY can be 
achieved for any possible quota shares 8 ∈ [0,1] and 8 = 1 − 8. 
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Proof: Total harvest of old mature fish is always equal to   in all possible quota shares since 
TAC is set higher than or equal to the maximum of two cut-off levels. Furthermore, both fleets 
harvest young mature fish to fulfill their quotas after the old mature fish stock is fully harvested on 
the first fishing day since    ≥ [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   and    ≥ [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . As a 
result, the total harvest of young mature fish is equal to    for all possible quota shares. 
Therefore, MSY can be implemented for all 8 ∈ [0,1] and 8 = 1 − 8. □ 
5   Numerical Illustration 
 A numerical example is given to clarify our solution to the implementation problem of MSY 
harvesting conditions. The arbitrary parameter values in Table 1, not directly related to any 
particular fisheries, are used for this illustration. The values of the endogenous variables , , , 
and  are calculated using the optimal harvest policy defined in Section 3 given that  	 0.2, 
 	 0.5,  	 0.8 and Beverton-Holt recruitment parameters:  	 10b,  	 1.2 c 10b and  	
1.2.  
Table 1 Fishery with a single age-structures fish stock 
Parameter  Description Values 
de Weight for the young mature fish 3.0 (kg/per fish) 
df Weight for the old mature fish 5.0 (kg/per fish) 
ge
f
 
Catchability coefficient (fleet 1) 0.04  
ge
e
 
Bycatch coefficient (fleet 1) 0   
gf
f
 
Catchability coefficient (fleet 2) 0.05  
gf
e
 
Bycatch coefficient (fleet 2) 0.01  
he Fishing mortality rate for young mature fish (at MSY) 0.1 
hf Fishing mortality rate for old mature fish (at MSY) 1 
ie Total population of young mature fish (at MSY) 100,000 
if Total population of old mature fish (at MSY) 45,000 
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The total biomass for each age class can now be calculated since the total population and average 
weight per fish values are given. Furthermore, by using (10), the TAC is calculated using MSY 
fishing mortalities derived from the overall yield optimization problem: 
;<= 	    +    	 255 tonnes. 
As being one of the key variables of the paper, fishing technologies on the first fishing day are 
calculated as follows: 
* 	
$

$
 + $

	 1, 
* 	
$

$
 + $

≅ 0.8. 
Given the fact that the only fleet 2 has imperfect fishing selectivity, it can be deduced that there is 
only one cut-off level for the TAC that can be written as: 
  + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]   	 281.25 tonnes. 
TAC is higher than the total weight of old mature fish ( ) and less than the cut-off level of 
  + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . Hence TAC is at a level satisfying the condition of 
2w X (1 + j)⁄ ≤ ;<= <   + [(1 − *) *⁄ ]  . Note also that the critical fishing 
mortality rate for the young mature fish is ∗ ≅ 0.08 < 1 	 0.1. The solution for this case was 
found as the following (Proposition 1.2): 
[  − * ;<=]
(1 − *);<=
≤  8 ≤
 
(1 + *);<=
 
8 	 1 − 8. 
The possible quota shares computed using the above equations are, 
n
(≅ 0.4118) ≤ 8 ≤
n
pnq
(≅
0.4902) and r
n
(≅ 0.5098) ≤ 8 ≤
rp
pnq
(≅ 0.5882) such that 8 + 8 	 1.  
As an example, equal quota shares, 8 	 8 	 0.5, cannot be a solution for this 
environment. At this quota shares allocation, the total harvest composition is ℎ12 	 125 tonnes, 11 	
0, ℎ2
2
	 100 tonnes, and 21 	 27.5 tonnes. Fleet 2 harvests 100 tonnes of old mature fish and 25 
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tonnes of young mature fish due to imperfect fishing technology (* 	 0.8) and fleet 1 harvests 125 
tonnes of old mature fish on the the first fishing day. All old mature fish are harvested on the first 
fishing day. Fleet 2’s degree of selection is zero on the second fishing day. Fleet 2 fulfills its quota 
by harvesting 2.5 additional tonnes of young mature fish on the second fishing day. Fleet 1 cannot 
fulfill its quota since there are not any old mature fish on the second day. Fishing season ends at the 
end of the second fishing day. Thus, the total biomass harvest & + & 	 252.5 ≠ ;<= 	 255 
tonnes, and equal allocation of quota shares cannot solve the implementation problem.  
6   Conclusion 
 In the reform process of CFP, the EU is seeking for an economically and socially viable, 
well-designed management system for EU fisheries (EC 2011). In this regard, the EU promotes 
measures for implementing MSY. The process is under way in this direction as pointed by 
Cardinale et al. (2013), but the EU will not be able to achieve the MSY target for all economically 
valuable fish stocks if the current trends continue (Froese and Proelß 2010). This paper analyzes the 
problem of designing quota shares allocation mechanisms or management systems to implement 
MSY harvesting conditions. It is shown that not only biological limitations due to the age structure 
of different fish populations but also composition of fisheries and different fishing technologies 
should be taken into consideration in the determination process of maximum catch limits. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that the determination process of individual quota shares is highly 
dependent on MSY harvesting conditions. Thus, one of the important policy implications of the 
analysis is that fishing technologies and TAC levels should be analyzed together while distributing 
fishing quota shares (or assigning property rights).  
 In the EU, TACs are determined at the Union level and distributed to the EU countries based 
on the principle of ‘relative stability’ (Frost and Andersen 2006). Member States use different 
management systems to allocate these assigned national quotas to domestic fleets. The allocation is 
usually determined by grandfathering, a proportional rule based on historical catches of existing 
fleets (Anderson et al. 2011). It is also possible to use auctions to determine the allocation of quota 
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shares in a Member State. This paper shows that allocating quota shares in a Member State 
according to this history depended proportional distribution rule or auctioning may not provide 
economically and biologically viable solutions to implement MSY since these allocation rules do 
not depend on the age distribution of a fish population and fishing technology composition of 
domestic fleets. Therefore, main policy suggestion of this study is that the technological structure of 
the fishing industry and the biological structure of fish populations should be considered in the 
process of distributing national quotas to implement MSY.  
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